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Abstract 
The paper aims to enrich the debate on the overvaluation/undervaluation of China yuan 
Renminbi (CNY) against USD and JPY by applying the concept of the Debt-Adjusted 
Real Exchange Rate (DARER). This approach is offering to monetary policy makers 
another indicator for more responsive management of this important economic variable. 
The general motivation for constructing DARER is the fact that long-term current 
account surplus (deficits) is linked with capital outflows (inflows), which often leads to 
real undervaluation (overvaluation) of domestic currency. DARER can signal to the 
authorities that the real exchange rate is becoming unsustainable in the medium term. 
Based on the DARER approach we also introduce three indicators of exchange rate 
misalignment.  
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1. Introduction 
 The economic development of China has been the most outstanding phenomenon in the 
world economy over at least the last ten years. China has become the first holder of 
international official reserves, the second host-country for foreign direct investment and the 
world’s third largest trading power. China’s exports of final goods to the US and the EU have 
expanded rapidly and have given rise to large trade surpluses. All these factors are increasing 
suspicions about the potential misalignment of the Chinese currency – yuan Renminbi (CNY) – 
especially against the US dollar. Chinese authorities have maintained a fixed exchange rate 
regime against USD since 1994. This exchange rate policy has influenced the development of 
the nominal effective exchange rate, which has been on average relatively stable (see lhs of 
Figure 1), albeit the gradual period of appreciation was recorded from 1994 to 2002 and during 
the current period as well. This figure also shows the development of the bilateral nominal 
exchange rates CNY/USD and CNY/JPY.  
 The developments of the real exchange rates are shown on the rhs of Figure 1. The 
bilateral real exchange rate of the CNY against USD has also been rather stable, despite rapid 
productivity gains and the accumulation of net foreign assets. The effective real exchange rate 
initially sharply appreciates (1993-98), than behave in average steadily (1998-01) and 
consequently shows the moderate depreciation trend (2002-05).  
Figure 1: The Nominal and Real Development of CNY   
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Note: NEER – nominal effective exchange rate, CNY - yuan Renminbi, USD – US dollar, JPY – Japanese Yen, REER – real effective exchange 
rate (deflated by CPI), RER – real exchange rate. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 The monitored exchange rate history was affected by the Chinese plan on joining the 
WTO. The dual exchange rate system was replacing by a unified scheme based on a basket of 
currencies. This regime only exists for 18 months. In the beginning of 1995 it was replaced by 
a peg to the US dollar at a rate of 8.277 CNY/USD with the narrow fluctuation margin (± 
0.18%). This helps to cut galloping inflation (28% y-o-y) at that time and to stabilize Chinese 
economy. Since 1996, CNY has been convertible for commercial operations on the current 
account. On the other hand, the regulations are still applied to financial transactions by 
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individuals and companies from the SAFE (State Administration of Foreign Exchange).1 The 
Chinese exchange rate policy is currently under pressure, as both official and business 
constituencies put forward different arguments: overheating of the economy, ongoing catching-
up that calls for real exchange-rate appreciation, “unfair” cost advantages benefiting the 
country, or capital controls that artificially back-up the exchange rate regime. The complex 
diagnosis of the misalignment of CNY is therefore not a simple task.  
 The proposition of the undervaluation of CNY is based largely on three main arguments – 
(i) the high dynamics of the Chinese’s export and growing of the current account surplus, (ii) 
the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the People’s Bank of China and (iii) massive 
foreign direct investment inflows to the Chinese economy– see Figure 2. All these factors 
together with the growing productivity of the Chinese industry are the main sources of the 
exchange rate pressures on the CNY. 
Figure 2: The Current account balance, FDI inflow and Foreign Exchange Reserves (billions of USD)   
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Note: CA – current account balance, FDI – net foreign direct investment, FXR – foreign exchange reserves (rhs).  
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 However, we could also formulate significant arguments to defend the currently applied 
fixed exchange rate regime. Firstly, the peg on the dollar has served the country well regarding 
its economic performance over the last few years. China has achieved strong growth with 
moderate inflation, and a modest current account surplus. Furthermore, it does not suffer from 
overall pent-up demand. Secondly, it is the weakness of Chinese banking system, especially to 
the structure of its forex balance sheets. A prior condition to introduce more flexibility in the 
exchange rate would be the improvement of the banking sector’s balance sheet in order to cope 
with the opening of the financial account. Thirdly, for the time being, it has not been possible to 
detect Balassa-Samuelson effects in China, probably because of the structural segmentation of 
the labour market. Fourthly, while Chinese exports are rising, import growth is very dynamic 
too. The entry of China to WTO at the end of 2001 has lead to the progressive fall in customs 
duties and other trade barriers, which could have the similar effect to import as the revaluation 
of CNY. Similarly, the Chinese trade surplus especially with the United States and European 
Union is more then off-set by the deficits with main Asian trade partners2. Finally, China’s 
                                                          
1 see for example Xiaopu (2003) 
2 excluded from the effect of Hong Kong economy 
 4
competitiveness stems mainly from structural factors. The level of wages is low and wages are 
flexible downward given the massive labour supply, which could lead to the elimination of the 
CNY revaluation.3  
 They are many ways in which greather flexibility could be introduced to the Chinese 
exchange rate policy: (i) gradual revaluation of the CNY, which is consistent with the current 
fixed but adjustable regime, (ii) a currency peg on a more diversified basket of world “reserve” 
currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GPB) according to the denomination of payments in the Chinese 
foreign trade, (iii) a widening of the fluctuation margin, (iv) moving to the floating exchange 
rate regime. The final decision would be also depend on the size of the exchange rate 
misalignment.  
2. The Essence of the DARER Concept 
 Misalignment currency has adverse effects on the long-term growth of the economy. There 
is a general belief that an overvalued currency leads to lower growth, but that an undervalued 
currency has an equivocal effect – see Razin and Collins (1997), for example. Either 
overvalued or undervalued currency also leads to the risk of a speculative attack, especially in 
the case of applied fixed exchange rate regimes. With the benefit of hindsight we can say that 
one of the main causes of these developments was the maintaining of misaligned currencies, 
leading to current account imbalance. 
 Consequently, if we want to evaluate the misalignment of the CNY, we ought to take 
current account and foreign direct investment into account. The DARER4 concept originally 
assumes that borrowing from abroad allows the current exchange rate level to be sustained via 
repression of the domestic price level and vice versa. If the nation uses external debt to deal 
with its growing deficit, the DARER path falls below the path of the actual real exchange rate. 
The real appreciation is thus faster than would be suggested by the path of the normally 
calculated real exchange rate (R), where the nominal rate is deflated by foreign and domestic 
price indices (usually the PPI or CPI). Similarly these effects hold for the current account 
surpluses.  
 The advantage of DARER is that it explicitly takes into account the development of current 
account of the economy. China is an example of an economy that is strongly affected by 
foreign capital and which has accumulated a sizeable current account surplus – see Figure 2. 
DARER helps us to realize this fact. If we make pragmatic use of its information content it can 
serve as a warning signal for exchange rate policy. By “pragmatic use” we mean that DARER 
should be used not in isolation, but as part of a group of indicators targeted at identifying 
whether the currency is overvalued or undervalued. If DARER indicates rising overvaluation 
(undervaluation), the relatively strong (weak) currency is being maintained largely at the 
expense of growing (falling) external debt5 and vice versa. It is then necessary to assess whether 
the relatively strong (weak) currency was really due solely to foreign capital flows influencing 
the debt, or whether there were other fundamental causes. If capital inflow was really the cause, 
                                                          
3 The sensitivity of exports to exchange rate movements is also limited because of approximately half of China’s export come 
from foreign subsidiaries set up in China. 
4 For the application of the DARER to selected new EU Member States see Frait and Komárek (2002). 
5 For monetary policy this means that it is necessary to consider altering the parameters of that policy so as to reduce the 
motivation for the growth in debt (specifically by changing interest rate policy or capital mobility). 
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it does not make sense to prevent devaluation (revaluation) of the currency. On the contrary, 
this action should be encouraged. 
Furthermore, we consider the concept of DARER appropriate to marry with the concepts of 
the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate, which are medium-term in nature and which does 
not take the external debt or surplus factor into account. Coupled with DARER, this would give 
us a better idea of the overvaluation or undervaluation of the currency. As a whole, such an 
approach could provide a supplement to main partial equilibrium approaches to estimating the 
medium-term real equilibrium exchange rate, i.e. – BEER (Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange 
Rate), CHEER (Capital-Enhanced Equilibrium Exchange Rate), FEER (Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate), ITMEER (Intermediate-Term Model-Based Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate), NATREX (Natural Real Exchange Rate), PEER (Permanent Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate) and so called Monetary Model. A detailed description of these variants of 
equilibrium exchange rate models could be found in MacDonald (2001), Égert (2003), Driver 
and Westaway (2005) or Horváth and Komárek (2007). 
3. Construction of the Model 
 The difference between the “standard” real exchange rate R and the DARER concept is 
apparent when we compare equations 1 and 2, where E expresses the nominal exchange rate, 
P* the foreign price level, P the domestic price level and PE the domestic equilibrium price 
level. 
R = E.P*/P          (1) 
DARER = E.P*/PE        (2) 
 Estimating DARER thus involves two steps: (i) estimating the equilibrium price level (PE), 
which is then used for (ii) estimating the path of the debt-adjusted real exchange rate 
(DARER). We start by defining the current account balance (deficit or surplus) as the 
difference between aggregate supply and aggregate demand at the current price level in the 
domestic economy:  
CA = S(P) - D(P)         (3) 
where CA is the current account, S is aggregate supply, D is aggregate demand and P is the 
theoretical product of the nominal exchange rate and the foreign price level [E.P*]. However, 
the build-up of the current account deficit (surplus) generates present and future external 
liabilities (assets) which must later be repaid6 (spend). This mechanism is formally described by 
the following equation:  
DS = S(PE) - D(PE)        (4) 
where DS is debt service and PE  is the price level that takes into account present and future 
debt service. By combining the two equations above we obtain a basic instrument for deriving 
the price repression (price pressures) implied by the growth in external debt ensuing from the 
current account balance: 
DS - CA = [S(PE) - S(P)] - [D(PE) - D(P)]      (5) 
                                                          
6 excess aggregate supply will have to be created at the equilibrium price level 
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 The point of this analysis is to obtain an approximation of the price repression caused by 
the borrowing (lending) resulting from the current account deficit (surplus). For this purpose, 
we can modify supply and demand as follows: 
S(PE) = S(P) + SP(P)(PE - P)       (5a) 
D(PE) = D(P) + DP(P)(PE - P),       (5b) 
where [SP(P)=dS/dP] and [DP(P)=dD/dP]. We can now substitute both expressions into 
equation 5 and obtain: 
DS - CA = (PE - P) [SP(P) - DP(P)]      (5c) 
which rearranges to give: 
(PE - P) = (DS - CA)/[SP(P) - DP(P)]      (5d)  
 This equation tells us that price repression always occurs when [(PE - P) > 0]. We can 
make the following modifications: 
SP(P) = εs(S(P)/P)        (5e) 
DP(P) = εD(D(P)/P),        (5f) 
where [εs = SP(P)/(P/S(P))] and [εD = -DP(P)/(P/D(P))], which are the elasticities of aggregate 
supply and demand respectively. Substituting these expressions into equation 5d we obtain: 
(PE - P) = {[DS - CA)/S(P)]/(εs + β εd)}P,     (5g)  
where β = [1 + (DS - CA)/S(P)]. By isolating PE we obtain an equation for approximating the 
equilibrium price level: 
PE = P + {[DS - CA)/S(P)]/(εs + β εd)}.P,     (6) 
where εs and εd are the elasticities of aggregate supply and demand and β = [1 + (DS - 
CA)/S(P)]. The difference between PE and P describes the extent of adjustment of prices 
(exchange ratios) needed if the country is to meet its present and future liabilities (assets). 
4. Indicators of Exchange Rate Misalignment  
 Given below are three indicators of misalignment, i.e. over/under valuation of the currency 
that proceed from the DARER concept. The first indicator (the debt misalignment index) 
identifies the currency misalignment due to the very existence of the debt. The second indicator 
(the trend misalignment index) applies the concept of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, Band-
Pass filter (BP) or other filtering methods, which is used to determine the “trend 
misalignment”. The third indicator (the total misalignment index) combines the two concepts to 
express, from a “broader” perspective, information on the overvaluation/undervaluation of the 
exchange rate.  
Debt misalignment of the exchange rate 
 The overvaluation attributable to the debt is expressed in concrete form by the debt 
misalignment index (IDO). The proposed formalized notation for the calculation of this index 
can be stated in the following form:  
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 IDM = {100/[100 + (DARER-R)]-1}.100      (7) 
 The debt index should say: “By what percentage the real exchange rate is misaligned 
owing to the build-up of external debt”. This misalignment is expressed in per cent and 
captures only the part of the short-run to medium-run misalignment made possible by deferring 
a current account reversal. 
Trend misalignment of the exchange rate 
 Trend misalignment is a rather “imperfect” substitute for misalignment comparing the 
current real exchange rate and the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate. The reason for this 
substitution is the continuing lack of a clear idea of the equilibrium exchange rate among 
economists modeling this variable in many developing countries. To calculate the trend 
misalignment we propose to use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter7 or the Band Pass Filter (BP). 
 In the case under review, the value of the parameter λ = 100 recommended for annual data 
was used. Based on knowledge of the HP filter, a trend misalignment index is defined below. 
The misalignment relative to the real exchange rate trend is expressed in concrete form by the 
trend misalignment index (ITrO). The proposed formalized notation for the calculation of this 
index can be stated in the following form: 
 ITrO = {100/[100 + (FT_R - R)]-1}.100      (8) 
Where R is the real exchange rate, FT_R is the trend of the R based on selected filtering 
methods. The debt misalignment index should say: “By what percentage the real exchange rate 
is misaligned relative to its trend”. This misalignment is also expressed in per cent. 
Total misalignment of the exchange rate 
 The debt misalignment only gives us an idea of the potential misalignment of the currency 
due to the build-up of external debt, not of the total misalignment. As noted above, for the latter 
we need to have an idea of the long-run fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate, which 
abstracts from the current account position. Owing to the shortness of the time series and other 
problems we do not have such an idea, so to obtain the equilibrium rate we have to use the 
aforementioned statistical filtering, i.e. HP or BP filter. This method has its fundamental 
limitations, so we should emphasize that the calculated estimates must be interpreted as rough 
orientation indicators, which need to be reconciled with the other indicators of the external 
position of the economy. 
 The total misalignment of the real exchange rate is expressed in concrete form by the total 
misalignment index (ITO). The proposed formalized notation for the calculation of this index 
can be stated in the following form: 
 ITO = {100 /[100+(DARER - FT_R )] - 1}.100    (9) 
The total misalignment index should say: “By what percentage the real exchange rate trend is 
misaligned due to the build-up of external balance”. This misalignment is also expressed in per 
                                                          
7 Calculation of misalignment using the deviation of the real exchange rate from trend is routinely applied in the 
empirical literature – see, for example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998), Kaminski, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) 
and IMF (1998). 
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cent. Alternatively, we can also obtain the value of the total misalignment by summing the debt 
misalignment and the trend misalignment (the deviations of the actual real exchange rate from 
the trend).   
5. DARER Estimates for the China 
 DARER has been applied empirically chiefly to newly industrialized nations and some 
new member states of the EU. Fabella (1996) has been made the estimates of DARER for the 
Philippines and Thailand during the period 1980–1992.8 Frait and Komárek (2002) make 
similar calculation for selected euro candidates, i.e. for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia. For empirical application to China, 1993 was chosen as the base year for the 
calculation. In this year the current switched from deficit to surplus, which than continues. The 
simulation was performed for annual data (from 1993 to 2006) for the both CPI and PPI 
indexes against USD and JPY. The Chinese CPI (PPI) was chosen as domestic price level P 
and the US and Japanese CPI (PPI) as foreign price level P*. Aggregate supply S(P) is proxied 
with gross domestic product, and aggregate demand is proxied with domestic absorption. As 
for exchange rates, only the bilateral nominal and real CNY/USD (CNY/JPY) rates were used. 
The difference (DS-CA) can be approximated in two ways. The first boundary approximation 
(pessimistic) is the entire current account balance (deficit or surplus). This case assumes that 
rapid attainment of a balanced current account would be desirable. The second boundary 
approximation (optimistic) is the current account balance minus net inflow of foreign direct 
investment. This case assumes that an improvement (lower deficit, higher surplus) in the 
current account is desirable only to the extent that the deficit is not financed by foreign direct 
investment. 
 To solve the elasticities problem, two options present themselves de facto. The first is to 
try to directly estimate Chinese elasticises from the structural macroenomic model. Given the 
problems in the data area, however, this is practically impossible for the time being. Hence 
typical elasticities for an open economy as given by Medalla (1986) were chosen. One should 
also understand that DARER, like any other real exchange rate, is an abstract concept based on 
specific assumptions. The elasticities chosen reflect the well-known theoretical fact – supported 
by a wealth of empirical work – that elasticities increase with increasing time horizon. If we 
assume that it is currently desirable to eliminate the deficit fairly quickly (and with a 
predominantly non-income effect), it is appropriate to use DARER as a short- to medium-run 
concept. For these reasons, we opted for compromise elasticity levels (εs = 0.3 and εd = 0.5).9  
 An important aspect of applying DARER is how to interpret its estimated values. 
Originally DARER was devised on its own, without other indicators of currency overvaluation. 
Here, DARER must be interpreted solely as an indicator of the degree of currency 
overvaluation stemming from external debt accumulation. Consequently, Komárek and Frait 
                                                          
8 Both conceptions were elaborated both on the bilateral exchange rate principle and for the effective exchange 
rate, i.e. taking into account the allocation, within the real exchange rate, of weights to the major trading partners 
of each country. 
9 The same elasticities (εs = 0.2 and εd = 0.4) were chosen in the work of Frait and Komárek (2002). Fabella (1996) 
recommends separating the elasticities into short-run (εs = 0.1 and εd = 0.4) and medium-run (εs = 0.3 and εd = 0.5). 
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(2002) propose, to use it as a medium-run concept (i.e. for medium-run elasticities) for 
identifying currency overvaluation.  
 When applying the DARER method empirically, it is also possible to take into account the 
forecast FDI profile in the estimate. In this variant, DARER can be adjusted for the current 
account (CA) and for the FDI effect. This gives us more estimates for the monitored variables, 
allowing us to further refine the assertion that the koruna is overvalued (undervalued). The 
logical effect of including FDI is a narrowing of the gap between DARER and the real 
exchange rate, which in turn reduces the debt overvaluation or contribute to the stronger 
undervaluation of the exchange rate.  
 This approach follows from the logic that the largest deviation of DARER from the real 
exchange rate occurred in 2006, when the current account surplus and FDI inflows were the 
largest. One of the problematic aspects of the model is also visible, namely its inability to 
differentiate between a narrowing of the deficit (surplus) due to the income effect and a 
narrowing of the deficit (surplus) due to the substitution effect.10 The results for the 
calculations using the CPI are very similar to those for the PPI, although owing to the faster 
growth in consumer prices the speed of the appreciation is faster and the potential 
undervaluation greater in the CPI variant. 
 The results of the DARER estimations deflated both by CPI and PPI index (including and 
excluding the FDI effect) against USD are given in Figure 3, against JPY in Figure 6 in 
appendix.  
Figure 3: Nominal and real CNY against USD and DARER  
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
E (CNY/USD)
R_CPI (CNY/USD)
DARER (CPI)
DARER_FDI (CPI)
 
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
E (CNY/USD)
R_PPI (CNY/USD)
DARER (PPI)
DARER_FDI (PPI)
 
Note: E – nominal bilateral exchange rate, R – real exchange rate, CPI – consumer price index, PPI – producer price index, FDI – foreign 
direct investment. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 The real exchange rate deflated both by CPI and PPI lies under the DARER trajectories, 
which indicates the undervaluation of the currency. The undervaluation of the Yuan against 
USD starts slowly in mid-1995 and maintain up to now. It could be also seen that the Chinese 
                                                          
10 However, the missing income effect in DARER in a way emphasises that the adjustment probably involves the 
substitution effect (expenditure switching) rather than a fall in domestic demand (expenditure reducing).  
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economy was not strongly affected by Asian crises during 1998-99, which also confirm our 
calculations.  
Figure 4: Total, debt and trend misalignment against USD (%)  
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Note: MT – total misalignment, MD – debt misalignment and MTr – trend misalignment, FDI – foreign direct investment. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 The calculations suggest that the real exchange rate of the Chinese currency is becoming 
increasingly undervalued both for CPI and PPI indexes. According to the variant taking FDI 
into account CNY is around 20% undervalued in real terms, but according to the FDI-excluding 
variant the yuan appears to be undervalued around 13%. This sizeable gap is due to the 
difference between the cumulative CA balance and the cumulative CA+FDI balance, as shown 
in Figure 3 for the USD, in Figure 6 than for JPY. Hence, the corridors of misalignment have to 
be constructed in order to show the dynamic of misalignment – see Figure 5 for the USD and 
Figure 8 for JPY in appendix.   
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Figure 5: Corridors of misalignment against USD  
  a) CPI deflated     b) PPI deflated  
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Note: MT – total misalignment, CPI – consumer price index, FDI – foreign direct investment, PPI – producer price index FDI – foreign direct 
investment. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
6. The Potential and Limitations of DARER 
 A basic limitation of DARER is the assumption that every current account deficit is 
accumulated in external debt that will, sooner or later, have to be repaid, and that the key 
stimulus for the shift from deficit to surplus will be a real depreciation of the domestic currency 
and vice versa. This ignores very important aspects of intertemporal optimization and 
macroeconomic adjustment. The current account is too complex a variable to be regarded as a 
basic indicator of overvaluation of the currency. The current account position needs to be 
assessed from several angles. One needs to ask whether the debtor nation is solvent, whether 
the deficit is excessive and whether it is sustainable. Sustainability can be assessed in numerous 
ways. The first involves extrapolating current macroeconomic policy and household behavior. 
In this case, sustainability is ensured if the resulting current account path is consistent with 
intertemporal solvency, i.e. if the economy optimizes consumption and investment 
intertemporally so that in otherwise unchanged conditions the current account position will 
shift smoothly from deficit to surplus. If, conversely, an unchanged situation is eventually 
going to lead to a drastic current account reversal or balance of payments crisis, the current 
account is assumed to be unsustainable. This view traditionally relates the dynamics of debt 
accumulation to the current account, economic growth, real interest rates on the debt, and the 
real exchange rate. However, it does not take sufficient account of the different impacts of debt 
and non-debt financing of the accumulated deficits on the external position of the country. This 
is why it is appropriate to augment the DARER variant excluding the FDI effect with the 
DARER variant taking FDI into account. 
 By considering these DARER variants, we arrive de facto at a fictitious band of 
overvaluation (undervaluation) of the currency. The upper boundary of this band (the variant 
excluding the FDI effect) reflects the need to repay in the future all debts ensuing from the CA 
deficits. The lower boundary conversely means that no CA deficits will have to be repaid in the 
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future. Intuitively it is clear that the “actual” real overvaluation will lie somewhere within this 
band, since the two scenarios given above are pretty extreme. 
 It is also clear that the ratio of external debt to GDP cannot grow without bound. 
Therefore, the current account position that will keep the ratio of external debt to GDP constant 
may be a basic measure of solvency. The problem is, though, that we do not know the optimal 
or appropriate boundary ratio of debt to GDP at steady state. Moreover, in economies as China 
which are converging to steady state, this ratio would not be relevant. And in the case of a fast-
growing economy with a low level of external debt, it would not make much sense to consider 
limiting the ratio of external debt to GDP. Another problem is that even if the solvency 
condition is adhered to, the economy may – in a world of high capital mobility – run into 
liquidity problems. 
 For these reasons, DARER must be viewed as one of a group of purely orientation 
indicators that can be applied in a situation where we have only a rudimentary idea about the 
economy. The indicators of overvaluation obtained using DARER cannot be viewed in relation 
to long-run fundamental equilibrium of the economy. On the other hand, though, we believe 
that the danger of overvaluation should not be underestimated, as it has well-known 
asymmetric negative effects, for example, on the long-term growth of the economy or on the 
outbreak of financial crises. 
 The prospect of an appreciation of the Chinese currency in real terms is a long-run 
phenomenon that will come out of a rise in non-traded goods prices accompanying more 
balanced growth. Due to concerns about the pitfalls inherent in reforming its domestic financial 
system, however China will rightly open its capital accounts with great care. We will 
recommend not consider changing the peg to float immediately and to discuss all relevant ways 
in which higher flexibility could be introduced to the Chinese exchange rate policy. The degree 
of real undervaluation subsequently increases, reaching in average almost 20-25% in the end of 
2006.  
 
References 
DRIVER, R. – WESTAWAY, P. (2005): Concepts of Equilibrium Exchange Rates, Bank of England Working 
Paper, No. 248. 
ÉGERT, B. (2003): Assessing Equilibrium Exchange Rates in CEE Acceding Countries: Can We Have DEER 
with BEER without FEER? A Critical Survey of the Literature, Focus on Transition 2/2003, pp. 38–106. 
FABELLA, R. V. (1996): The Debt-Adjusted Real Exchange Rate. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
1996, vol. 3, pp. 475-484. 
FRAIT, J. – KOMÁREK, L. (2002): Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Debt-Adjusted Real Exchange 
Rate in Selected Transition Economies During 1994-2001. Warwick Economics Research Papers, no. 646, 
Department of Economics, The University of Warwick. 
HORVÁTH, R. – KOMÁREK, L. (2007): Equilibrium Exchange Rates in the EU New Members: Methodology, 
Estimation and Applicability to ERM II. Prague Economic Papers, no. 1. 
IMF (1998): Financial crises: characteristics and indicators of vulnerability (ch. IV). In: World Economic Outlook, 
Washington, D.C. IMF, May 1998. 
KAMINSKI, G. – LIZONDO, S. - REINHART, C. (1997): Leading indicators of currency crises. IMF Working 
Paper, Washington, D.C. IMF, July 1997, no. 97/79. 
MacDONALD, R. (2000): Concepts to Calculate Equilibrium Exchange Rates: An Overview. Discussion Paper, 
Economic Research Group of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 13
MEDALLA, E. (1986): Impact Effects of Tariff Reform Programm. Tariff-Commission-PIDS Joint Research 
Project Staff Paper, 1986, no. 86-05. 
MILESI-FERRETI, G. M. - RAZIN, A. (1998): Current account reversals and currency crises: empirical 
regularities. Washington, D.C. IMF, IMF Working Paper, June 1998, no. 98/89. 
RAZIN, O. – COLLINS, S. (1997): Real exchange rate misalignments and growth. In: Razin, A.-Sadka, E. (eds.): 
International Economic Integration: Public Economics Perspectives. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press,1997. 
XIAOPU, Z. (2003): Capital Account Management and its Oultook in China. BIS Papers, No. 15 
 
 14
Appendix  
Figure 6: Nominal and real CNY against JPY and DARER  
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Note: E – nominal bilateral exchange rate, R – real exchange rate, CPI – consumer price index, PPI – producer price index, FDI – foreign 
direct investment. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 
Figure 7: Total, debt and trend misalignment against JPY (%)  
  a) excluding FDI (CPI deflated)   b) including FDI (CPI deflated)   
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  c) excluding FDI (PPI deflated)   d) including FDI (PPI deflated)   
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Note: MT – total misalignment, MD – debt misalignment and MTr – trend misalignment, FDI – foreign direct investment. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 
Figure 8: Corridors of misalignment against JPY 
 a) CPI deflated      b) PPI deflated  
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Note: MT – total misalignment, CPI – consumer price index, FDI – foreign direct investment, PPI – producer price index. 
Source: own calculations based on IMF-IFS and EIB (The Economist) data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
